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 Payments for Environmental Services: To whom, where, and how much? 
 
Jennifer Alix-Garcia, Alain de Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet 








Abstract: In this paper we consider different strategies for implementing a payment for environmental services 
(PES) program to mitigate deforestation in Mexican common property forests (ejidos).  We begin by discussing 
the policy context within which PES programs find themselves, highlighting other possible interventions to help 
preserve environmental amenities in Mexico.  We then discuss some basic principles of environmental payment 
schemes, formalizing these into three that we simulate: payment of the opportunity cost for forests at risks; 
payment for environmental benefits provided by forests at risk; a flat payment scheme with a cap on allowable 
hectares, similar to the type of program often applied in developing countries; and a program of opportunity 
cost payments for forest at risk with highest environmental benefit per dollar paid.  We find that, of these three, 
the last is most efficient and the second most egalitarian.  We also repeat a simulation of the third scheme using 
predicted, rather than actual risk, which circumvents the problem of strategic behavior on the part of recipient 
communities but introduces some error into the targeting process.  Finally, we consider the characteristics of 
communities that receive payments from the most efficient program, finding that larger and more remote ejidos 
receive the lion’s share of the budget, but that payments to them are not necessarily more efficient.  This scheme 
also gives more, though smaller on a per capita basis, payments to poor and indigenous communities, where 
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Though few experts agree on the exact figure, the consensus is that Mexico has the second highest 
deforestation rate in the world. In addition, it suffers from decreasing soil quality and increasing water scarcity, 
problems both associated with forest loss.  Furthermore, it is among the most biologically diverse countries in 
the world, with first place in reptilian diversity, third in bird, and fourth in mammal diversity.  Its plant diversity 
exceeds that of the United States and Canada combined, and survival of both the flora and fauna is importantly 
associated with protection of existing forest (CNF, 2001).  This combination of facts has thrust Mexican 
environmental policy into center stage both at home and abroad, and is the motivation for the paper at hand.    
According to the Mexican National Forestry Commission (CNF), 80% of the country’s forests are 
located in ejidos, communities resulting from the post-Revolution land reform, which hold their forestry and 
grazing lands in common property.  Their large forest holdings make them an essential place where to begin 
addressing the deforestation problem.  The policy proposed by the government to slow deforestation, and the 
main subject of this paper, is a payment for environmental services (PES) scheme, where communities receive 
cash in exchange for an agreement to manage forest, reforest, or implement other conservation-friendly resource 
management schemes.  PES programs are currently in place in Costa Rica and the United States and are being 
piloted in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, among other countries (World Bank, 2003).   
The purpose of this paper is not to explain why deforestation happens, but rather to discuss steps 
towards introducing conservation programs and to analyze the effects of program design for nationwide 
payment schemes. To this end, we begin by putting the preservation of environmental services in a general 
environmental policy context and summarize the data used in this paper.  We follow this with a brief discussion 
of steps towards deforestation mitigation, continue with an analysis of alternative designs for payment programs, 
consider the characteristics of the recipient communities, and conclude with a discussion of possible challenges 
to program implementation. 
We find that a scheme of flat payments for all forest with a cap, similar to those being implemented in 
Mexico and Costa Rica, is very egalitarian, but highly inefficient. A scheme based on paying the opportunity cost 
only for forest at risk generates more than three times the benefits at the same price as the flat payments 
PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE  3program.  Simulation of a program which maximizes the environmental benefits per dollar spent increases 
efficiency over the opportunity cost program by nearly ten times.  When we use predicted rather than actual risk 
to implement the last program, we find that there is some error in targeting, but that the efficiency is still much 
greater than a traditional flat payments program.  
 
2   Description of the Data 
In this section we briefly describe the data used in the calculations.  In the summer of 2002, Mexico’s 
National Ecology Institute (INE) , together with the Iberoamericana University, the Center for Economic 
Education and Research (CIDE), the University of California at Berkeley, and the World Bank, conducted a 
survey of Mexican ejidos.  The purpose of the survey was to understand the deforestation process in these 
communities in order to inform the design of a PES program.  The study randomly sampled 450 ejidos larger 
than 100 hectares located in the forested regions of the country. Surveys were completed for 407 ejidos. The 
total universe of forested ejidos is 7,679.   The total amount of forest covered by our sample is 2,106,592 
hectares of primary and secondary forest. Communities surveyed are not dispersed evenly across the country, as 
we can see from Table 1, which describes their distribution by region. 
Table 1.  Distribution of forest ejido universe by region* 































*Table provided by the Instituto Nacional de Ecología 
 
      The final sample included ejidos in all states with the exception of Baja California, Coahuila, Guanajuato, 
Zacatecas, Morelos, and Aguascalientes.  It should be considered a representative sample of the existing forest-
holding ejidos of Mexico.  In order to calculate forest cover, we use the Forest Inventories of 1993 and 2000, 
which were constructed by visual interpretation from satellite images with pixels of 30 meters at a scale of 
1:250,000 (Velázquez et al., 2002).  In addition, we calculate slopes from digital elevation models with 90 meter 
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distribution of the sample of ejidos is shown in Map 1. 
Map 1: Distribution of ejidos surveyed, 2002 
 
2.1  Stock of forest in our sample 
      Overall, 86% of the ejidos in our sample currently have primary forest.  The area of primary forests is largely 
related to ejido size, which varies considerably across ejidos.  Total ejido area ranges from 180 to 170,143 
hectares in our sample.  The average percentage of a given ejido in primary forest is 34.7%.  On a per capita 
basis, the distribution of the forest is quite skewed.  Though the average number of hectares per capita is 37, the 
median is 6.5 and the Gini coefficient .83.  This suggests that any payment program disbursed on a per hectare 
basis will be similarly unequal in its distribution across communities and individual members. 
 
2.2    Changes in the forest from 1993-2000 
The next question of interest regards trends in forest change.  We calculate total deforestation rate over 
our sample to be about 1.2% per year, which is comparable to what Torres and Flores (2001) term the 
“conservative estimate” of 1.3% per year.   In our sample, the average ejido deforested about 1.3% per year over 
the period 1993-2000. For our purposes, deforestation is defined as the change of primary or secondary forest to 
agriculture or pasture. 
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There is a clear consensus on a national and international level that the rate of deforestation in Mexico is too 
high relative to the social optimum and that something needs to be done.  The current policy of choice, now 
being piloted, is a national level payment for environmental services program financed through Federal fiscal 
revenues.  There is a sense, however, in which this should be the last step in a series of policies to conserve 
environmental services.  There are at least two less expensive interim policies that could be effective initial steps 
in addressing deforestation: liberating “win-win” solutions and local environmental services agreements.      
 
3.1.  Liberating “win-win” solutions 
Liberating “win-wins” implies addressing existing inefficiencies within the agencies responsible for forest 
regulation and other agencies whose policies may indirectly encourage forest misuse.  They are “win-wins” 
because they encourage forest conservation and are aligned with private incentives.  This means analyzing 
current policies and assessing whether they help or hinder deforestation.  For example, is the forest permit 
system so complicated that it creates an inordinately high transactions cost, pushing forest owners into illegality?  
Why is it that so few of the communities with forestry potential have actually obtained permits?   
Although it is difficult to clearly identify all of the the sources of forest loss, particularly illegal ones, we did 
discover that in 2002, about 20% of the ejidos sampled stated that they had experienced theft of trees from their 
land.  An effective policy to address this activity could do much to slow down deforestation in Mexico.  It is also 
important to keep in mind that tree-stealing is a symptom of some larger incentive problem, usually associated 
with ill defined and inadequately enforced property rights. 
Even within the realm of legal forest management, it would appear that there is room for improvement.  In 
ejidos that extract wood for profit, around 36% do not actively reforest afterwards in spite of the investment 
made in obtaining a permit.  Among those that reforest, the average survival rate of the hectares reforested is 
only around 58%.  The correlation between lack of reforestation effort and deforestation at the ejido level is –
0.05, suggesting that higher deforestation is associated with not reforesting post-harvest.  The correlation 
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improvements in the quality of the reforestation effort is also important in lowering net deforestation.   
We currently have no way of telling if forestry ejidos are exceeding their permit levels, although there is some 
anecdotal evidence that permits are, indeed, enforced.  We also do not know if this is the optimal policy for 
managing a forest.   What we can tell is that the process of forest management within the permit system is far 
from systematic and that technicians in some regions are insufficiently engaged.  Introducing more uniformity in 
technical assistance, monitoring post-harvest activities, and keeping track of illegal wood sales could do much to 
reduce forest loss, expectedly at a lower cost than compensating for ill-devised or ill-applied policies through 
PES.     
 
3.2.  Local markets for environmental services      
The second option to reducing deforestation is to look for self-sustaining markets for environmental services 
at the local level.  There is at least one case of this type of activity in Mexico related to forestry: in the coastal 
state of Veracruz, lowland communities are paying those higher up in the watershed to conserve the remaining 
forest cover (SEMARNAT, 2003).  There are surely more opportunities for this sort of local trade, particularly 
through the existing regional water districts.  Many environmental externalities, especially water-related ones, are 
highly localized within specific watersheds.  Unless coordination problems across states are extremely difficult, it 
makes sense to have a watershed-specific transfer to pay for these services. Payments for well-defined local 
services are also easier to administer than a nationwide program and less exposed to the instability of the federal 
political process.   
Another small-scale environmental services market that is quite active in some places is the international 
environmental market.  Many environmentalists in industrialized countries perceive and are willing to pay for the 
international negative externalities of the loss of carbon sequestration capacity and biodiversity.  The Nature 
Conservancy has long been a purchaser of lands for environmental services in other countries, and even 
Formula One race car drivers in the US are now buying amounts of forest corresponding to the quantity that 
would be needed to mitigate the CO2 emissions of their activities (FIA, 2003). 
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active, there remain two options for conserving the environmental services still at risk: coercion and incentives.  
A nationwide PES program falls in the latter category.  Mandating conservation by law (and enforcing that 
mandate) can be just as effective as a payment scheme for forest conservation.  However, the legality of coercion 
depends on property rights, and it may be quite costly to enforce both monetarily and politically.  When services 
are provided freely by legal owners of the resource, putting into place a payments system based on fiscal 
revenues can be effective.  The remainder of the paper explores the different ways one can design an 
environmental incentive program and the effects that design can have on efficiency and equity.   
 
4.  Alternative payment schemes – theoretical considerations 
There are many possible ways of designing an environmental payment scheme.  Any variation in design will 
change the kind of environmental services obtained and the people who receive them.  Conceptually, there are 
an upper and a lower bound on the “prices” which one can pay per hectare in a PES program – the opportunity 
cost and the value of the environmental services provided by the land.  In this section we discuss some 
principles to be maintained regardless of the type of program design chosen.   
 
4.1.  Basic principles 
     Two criteria essential for the establishment of a PES program are targeting (what to pay for) and the 
magnitude of the payments.  In theory, these should be jointly defined to maximize environmental benefits at a 
given budget and therefore the optimal scheme depends upon the response function of the recipients, in this 
case, the ejidos.  To formalize, let UF  be the utility derived from the standing forest, denoted 
by  . This function depends on the value that ejido e can derive from deforesting a quantity of 
( ,; ee e e Fc Fz −∆ ∆ ) e
e F e F −∆ ∆Fe , 
where   is its opportunity cost per hectare and z  are ejido characteristics.  The optimal deforestation level is 
thus a function of the initial standing forest, the opportunity cost and the characteristics: 
e c e
() ,, ee e FF F c z ∆= ∆ %
e  
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accept the contract if: 
e P
    () () ,; , ; eee e ee ee UFPz UF Fc Fz ≥− ∆ ∆ %%
 
Let P e,min be the minimum value that satisfies this condition.  Given the environmental benefit b  provided per 
hectare in ejido e, the optimal transfer scheme is the solution to: 
e
 
     () ,min max 1 , ,
e
ee e e e
P e
PP F F c z b  ≥∆ ∑  e
 s.t.    ,min 1 ee e
e
PP PP  ≥≤ ∑   
 
Ideally, one would like to know the monetary value equivalent to the utility that ejidos derive from standing 
forest.  In the absence of such an estimation procedure, one can use  ,min ee Pc e F = ∆ %  as an upper bound for the 
acceptability of the scheme to the ejido (this is equivalent to ignoring the loss in utility associated with the 
decrease in standing forest).   Ejidos accept the payment and agree to not deforest if the payment   is at least as 
high as the opportunity cost of converting the land into pasture/crops, and do not accept the contract if the 
offered payment is below the opportunity cost: 
e P
 If  Pc   () ,, 0 ee e e e e F F c z F ≥∆ ⇒ ∆ =
 If  () ( ) ,, ,, ee e e e e e e e F F c z F F F c z <∆ ⇒ ∆ = ∆ Pc  
4.2  Opportunity cost or environmental benefit? 
       This section speaks to the quantity of payments offered to communities.  Should one pay the minimum 
value necessary to preserve the environmental benefits, the opportunity cost  , or the entire value of the good 
being purchased, the environmental benefit b ? In reality, this is a question of property rights.  However, two 
additional facts come to bear here: first, an ejido will only accept a contract that is greater than its opportunity 
cost, which implies that if a benefits scheme is chosen and the value is not higher than their profits in alternative 
activities, deforestation will still occur.  Second, payments can only be socially justified if the benefits offered by 
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       If one looks at the formulae above, the optimal contract only pays for the hectares that would otherwise be 
deforested, i.e, for  , which varies with the deforestation rate.  In actuality, one frequently observes 
a flat payment per hectare of currently standing forest   with a cap.  In many places, this payment varies with 
quality of forest in terms of benefits, but the point here is that it does not depend on the deforestation rate. An 
argument in favor of this flat payment is the simplicity of the implementation and the impression of fairness that 
it gives, as it does not take into account deforestation behavior.   
( ,, eee FFcz ∆ )
e F
       Given that most countries’ conservation schemes operate with a limited budget, it is essential to consider 
the most efficient distribution of these monies.  If the goal of the program is to conserve the largest amount of 
environmental benefits for a given cash outlay, the optimal scheme consists in ranking the ejidos by decreasing 
ratio of benefit/payment and include those with highest ratio until the budget is exhausted (this is far from a 
novel result: see also Babcock et al. (1996), Ribaudo (1989)).   
 
4.4  A word about contracts 
       Regardless of the choice of targeting scheme, the contract must be made over the entire area of the ejido.  
Neglecting this consideration could lead to “slippage” (a term coined by Wu (2000)), that is, if a contract is 
incomplete, then deforestation may simply be transferred from a contracted to an uncontracted area of forest.  
Hence, typically, the contract should specify a payment against no deforestation on all of the hectares that have 
an opportunity cost below their environmental benefits.  
 
5  Proposed simulations 
       In this section we discuss the simulations that we will take to the data in this paper.  Building from our 
theoretical considerations, we have chosen 4 payment schemes:  
1.  A payment for hectares at risk of deforestation at their opportunity cost [Rc]. 
2.  A payment flat payment over all hectares with a cap, at a rate that gives the same aggregate budget as 
Rc, with the objecting of simulating a scheme similar to those observed [F]. 
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budget arbitrarily set at 2/3 of the budget of the first scheme, to illustrate how the budget constraint 
could be optimally dealt with [C]. 
4.  A payment equivalent to [C], but implemented using predicted deforestation in lieu of observed 
deforestation.  We will discuss the details of this approach in a later section. 
 
5.1  Rental of hectares at risk 
 
       We allow for heterogeneity of environmental benefits within ejidos.  Each hectare of forest is characterized 
by  .  Ideally, one would prefer an actual monetary value for the environmental benefits offered by a given 
piece of land.  In reality, however, this is quite difficult to establish, so for the purposes of our simulations we 
establish an index value   that allows the ranking of each hectare of forest by its relative environmental value.  
Note that this does not allow us to exclude lands whose true environmental value is less than the opportunity 
cost.     
j b
j b
      Let   be the number of hectares with environmental benefits   in ejido e, with∑ . Assume that 
there is a constant deforestation rate 
ej F j b ej e
j
FF =
ej τ  of forest of category j in the ejido.  The first year of the program, the 
unchallenged deforestation would convert   of forest of quality j into pasture.  The second year, an 
additional 
ej ej F τ
ej τ  of the remaining forest   would be converted, and similarly the following years.  The 
deforested area after t years would thus be: 
( − ) ej ej F τ 1
       () 11
t t
ej ej ej FF τ  ∆=− − 

If the program is to prevent deforestation over the years, it should thus “rent” an increasing share of the forest. 
Payments based on the opportunity cost, assuming that the environmental benefits of all hectares exceed the 
cost, would be:       Because we are paying exactly their opportunity cost, ejidos will always accept 
the contract. The 
,
t




participating ejidos are those that would otherwise deforest.  Note that the contract is for no 
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enrolled in the contract is  .    ej
j
F ∑ Environmental benefits obtained by contracts in the participating ejidos are:  
.  In the rest of the paper we will only consider the first year of payment, and leave out 
the t superscript.   
,,
tt
eR c eR b j e j
j
BB b F == ∆ ∑
,, eR c PP  
, eR c P
t
 
5.2  Flat payment 







 All ejidos are offered a contract, but an ejido will only accept the contract and thus participate in the scheme if 
the opportunity cost of the area it would otherwise deforest is less than the offer:   Pc ,, eF e e j e j eR c
j
F P τ ≥= ∑  
In order to facilitate comparison of the two schemes, the rate r is established at the level that equalizes the total 
budget to the budget of the scheme Rc.  It thus solves 
       , , 1 eF eF eR c
ee
P P ≥= ∑∑
 
5.3  Constrained program 
       If the total payment   exceeds the available budget, the optimum scheme consists in ranking the 













  and paying the opportunity cost 
,, eC eR c e e j e j
j
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6.1   Calculation of the opportunity cost 
In order to measure the opportunity cost of forested land, we use the rainfed land rental rates reported in 
the 2002 ejido survey.  Because this rate was not reported for all ejidos, we use the value of the rental rate 
predicted by the following regression equation:  
 
Variable Coefficient  T-statistic 
 
Average distance to forest in km 
 
Average distance squared 
 
Average altitude of forest in meters 
 






Total size in 1000 ha 
 



































































    The average rental rate was $103 US (sd $70) and the Gini coefficient of the per hectare rate is .37.  The 
distribution of per hectare rental rates is shown in figure 1. 













Figure 1: Distribution of predicted rental rates 
 
6.3   Calculation of the environmental benefits index 
Ideally, b  should be expressed in monetary terms.  In principle, a team of environmental scientists and 
economists can establish these values.  The research on hydrological benefits remains highly debated, with 
values for hydrological services ranging from $20/ha (Chomitz et al, 1998) to $188 (Hernández, et al., 2003).  
Still other studies suggest that a mixture of pasture and forest cover generates even higher hydrological benefits 
that contiguous forest (Aylward and Tognetti, 2002).  Hesitant to enter into this valuation debate, we have 
instead established a set of environmental index based upon both the scale of payments for the existing PES 
scheme in Mexico and the country’s environmental priorities.  Given that a major concern in Mexico is water 
quality, it makes sense to give forests of communities that are closer to major rivers a higher priority than those 
whose forests do not have this characteristic.  Because a detailed river map of the country is not available, we 
used digital elevation models to establish where the highest flow of water across the landscape would be.  
Around areas of high flow, we calculated a buffer distance of one kilometer as the area whose erosion would 
most affect water quality and infiltration, and gave a priority to forest in these areas. 
j
        The calculations below should be taken as a first approximation of the total amount of land included.  
In addition, we give higher values to those communities located in watersheds which have been defined as over-
exploited.  Over-exploited watersheds have been identified and mapped by INE.  Using GIS, we identified those 
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forests, as well as to tropical versus temperate and dry forests.  Finally, given that cloud forest is of particular 
concern because of its status as an endangered ecosystem in Mexico and is thought to produce a higher value of 
water services, we give them extra value as well.  All forest types were calculated according to the classification in 
the 2000 Forest Inventory. 
Table 2 describes one way of ranking the environmental benefits provided by different types of forest in 
different locations. 
Table 2.  Constructing an environmental index 
Characteristic  Points per hectare
 
Cloud forest 
      Primary  
      Secondary 
 
Temperate or dry forest 
      Primary  
      Secondary 
 




Within ½ mile of a river 
       Primary 
       Secondary 


















The average benefits per hectare are 30.6 (sd 5.3), a Gini coefficient of .11, and the distribution shown in figure 
2. 













Figure 2: Distribution of environmental benefits scores per hectare 
 
6.4  Observed deforestation rate τej 
       In the first three simulations, we use the observed deforestation rate between 1993 and 2000.  In our 
sample, 61% of the communities have positive deforestation over this time period.  The average deforestation 
rate for the sample is 1.3% and amongst those that deforest it is 2.1%.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of the 
positive deforestation rates. Note the clustering at very low levels of deforestation – payments to these 
communities will necessarily be quite small. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of positive deforestation rates 
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       We simulate our three schemes as if they were put in place in 1993 and we are observing the results one year 
later.   The results are reported in tables 3 and 4.  The flat payment here ended up being $5 per hectare with the 
opportunity costs budget as a constraint.  In comparing the first two programs, we see that participation and 
equity are much higher in the flat payment program than in the opportunity cost program.  In the most efficient 
program, where we use 2/3 the budget of the first program, we have more than 2/3 participation and a slightly 
lower Gini coefficient.   
Table 3. Summary of payments and participants in different programs 
Payment rule  Opportunity cost 
for forest at risk 
Flat payment with 
a cap at 2000 ha 
Opportunity cost 
for forest at risk 
with highest 
environmental 
benefit per $ paid 
 
Percent of ejidos enrolled 
 
Average payment per 
participating ejido 
 
Median payment per 
participating ejido 
 




































Table 4 highlights the tradeoff we make between the inequality of the first and third programs and their 
efficiency.  Despite its higher participation, the flat payments program enrolls less than a third of the total 
hectares at risk of deforestation, and its efficiency is also less than a third of that of the opportunity costs 
program.   This is due to the fact that it enrolls many ejidos that do not have positive deforestation. The optimal 
distribution of the constrained budget, shown in column three, results in the enrollment of nearly all of the 
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  Payment rule  Opportunity cost 
for forest at risk 
Flat payment  Opportunity cost 






Total hectares enrolled 
 



















































        
Table 5 illustrates another measure of efficiency – the dollar amount paid for each hectare at risk of 
deforestation.  Note that this is extremely large for the flat payment schemes (despite the fact that those with 
zero deforestation cannot be included) and smallest for the optimal strategy.   
 
Table 5: Payments per hectare at risk of deforestation 
  Opportunity cost for 
forest at risk 
Flat payment  Opportunity cost for 
forest at risk with 
highest environmental 
benefit per opportunity 
cost 
 
Mean payment per hectare at risk 
 
Minimum payment per hectare at risk 
 




















The following three graphs show us the distribution of payments per hectare of forest at risk of deforestation in 
each of the programs.   









































Distribution of payments per hectare at risk: optimal budget distribution program 
 
 
PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE  19 
6  Implementation – Prediction of the deforestation rate 
 
       In order to avoid strategic behavior on the part of ejido communities, it is essential to use the predicted 
rather than the actual deforestation rate.  This section focuses on the application of two predictions of the 
deforestation rate to the most efficient program.  Whatever prediction is chosen, it must be based exclusively on 
determinants  xe that are truly exogenous to the behavior of the ejido (so that the scheme does not reward bad 
behavior), i.e., physical endowment of the ejido (area of different types of land, maybe on per capita basis), and 
structural characteristics such as distance, population, ethnicity, etc.  We assume a uniform deforestation rate per 
ejido (i.e., all categories j of forest have the same deforestation rate  e τ ), and perform the estimation on the 
observed sample of ejidos.  Although this estimation gives prediction of the expected conditional deforestation 
rate   in the population of ejidos of characteristic  , the actual optimal rate of deforestation of a specific 
ejido e remains unknown to outsiders:  , where   represent the idiosyncratic shock or behavior of 
the ejido, drawn from the estimated distribution 
() ˆ e x τ e x
() ˆ ˆˆ ee xu ττ =+ e ue
( )
2 ˆ 0, N σ .   
     Armed with this analysis, we simulate the most efficient scheme based on the predicted deforestation rate  ˆ  τ  e
ee j F
 
as follows:  We first rank ejidos by decreasing ratio of benefits over cost (which is independent of the 
deforestation rate), as we did above.  We then pay the predicted conditional expected deforestation   
proportionately to the expected opportunity cost 
ˆ τ
( ) , ˆ 1 eI e e e j
j
Pc µτ =+ ∑ F  to those with the highest ratio. 
     A specific ejido will accept the scheme if the payment compares favorably to the opportunity cost of its 
optimal deforestation rate, i.e., if:  ( ) , ˆ eI e e e e j
j
Pcu τ ≥+ ∑ F  which can also be written:  ( ) ˆ 1 ee u ˆ e τ µτ +≤+ .  This shows 
that if the payment is set at the expected opportunity cost,  0 µ = , all the ejidos with higher deforestation rates 
than the average will not accept the contract.  Conversely, all ejidos with predicted rates lower than average are 
compensated for their “good” behavior.  This means that only half of the ejidos will accept the offer.  By 
proposing a higher payment, µ > 0, the program faces a trade-off in paying more than necessary for many 
ejidos but attracting more of them in the scheme.  The expected environmental benefits provided by an ejido 
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j
bE u u τµ +≤ ∑ ) ) ˆ F τ .  It follows that the optimal value for the payment level 
µ is determined by the overall optimization program: 
 
     ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ max Pr
e
eej e e ee
P ej
ub E u u µτ τ µτ ≤+ ≤  ∑∑  e j F  
    s.t.    , ˆ ee e I
e
uP µτ Pr P ≤ ≤   ∑  
 
6.1  Two prediction equations 
 
      We present in table 6 two different prediction equations.  The first is a parsimonious specification, 
containing only easily observable, mostly physical variables, while the second includes a range of variables 
associated with deforestation in common property communities.  The former represents a technique suitable for 
application in policy settings.  The intention of presenting both options is to see if any targeting precision is lost 
in omitting behaviors representing community behavior.   
     The full specification shows a small increase in the R-squared of the regression over the parsimonious 
specification – from .38 to .42.  This suggests that the second may have superior predictive power to the first.  























PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE  21Table 6: Prediction equations for deforestation 









Total area of the ejido in hectares  -0.02  -0.02 
 (1.34)  (1.38) 
Hectares of forest in 1993  0.13  0.13 
 (3.27)**  (3.41)** 
Forest squared  -0.00  -0.00 
 (2.51)*  (2.62)** 
Forest cubed  0.00  0.00 
 (2.41)*  (2.47)* 
Percentage of total area in forest, 1993  163.55  165.66 
 (1.48)  (1.51) 
Average distance to forested area  -8.00  -12.87 
 (0.70)  (1.11) 
Average slope of forested area  -15.75  -16.22 
 (1.61)  (1.72) 
Hectares of forest*average slope  -0.00  -0.00 
 (0.70)  (0.69) 
Average altitude of forested area in meters  -0.05  -0.08 
 (0.79)  (1.28) 
Average distance*average slope  -0.49  -0.52 
 (0.54)  (0.59) 
Average distance*average altitude  0.01  0.01 
 (1.49)  (1.91) 
Ejido practices forestry 20.06  9.85 
 (0.27)  (0.12) 
Number of ejidatarios in 1990  0.03  0.28 
 (0.10)  (1.73) 
Number of ejidatarios squared  -0.00   
 (0.37)   
Distance to nearest city in kilometers  -0.39  -0.32 
 (0.88)  (0.72) 
Average number of people per hh with secondary education    -198.26 
   (2.38)* 
Average parcel size of ejidatarios in hectares    -2.56 
   (2.57)* 
Number of ejidatarios*Gini coefficient of private parcels     -0.91 
   (2.40)* 
Membership ratio*forestry ejido    -39.70 
   (0.44) 
Ratio of members to total population in ejido    -4.75 
   (3.04)** 
Gini coefficient of private parcels    -226.69 
   (1.76) 
Predicted proportion of population receiving Progresa   -625.29 
   (1.78) 
Constant 145.34  704.84 
 (1.21)  (2.70)** 
Observations 395  395 
R-squared 0.38  0.42 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Interestingly, there is not much gain from the considerable expansion of the variable set in (2) – only a .1 (or 
7 %) increase in efficiency.  The efficiency levels are considerable lower than that of the most efficient 
program using the actual deforestation rates, at .35, but are still twice as efficient as the flat payments 
program at .08.  As in the actual program, the Gini coefficients of payments for these predicted programs 
are considerably higher than that of the flat payments program, which has a Gini of .32.   
Table 7. Summary of payments and participants in different programs 
Payment rule  Specification (1)  Specification (2) 
 
Percent of participating 
ejidos 
 
Average payment per 
participating ejido 
 
Median payment per 
participating ejido 
 
Gini coefficient of payments 
over participants 
 
Total hectares enrolled 
 





























































This leads us to the question of where the misallocation of payments occurs.  Table 8 shows the characteristics 
communities with payments in different error categories.  Here we see that specification (2) gives us slightly less 
type I error and slightly more type II, though these differences are minimal.  The type II error comes entirely 
from deforestation rates that are estimated to be positive for ejidos that in reality had no deforestation.  These 
communities also have very high benefits and low opportunity costs, which means they ranked quite high on our 
benefits to cost scale.  Communities with type I error have very high deforestation rates (and were under-
predicted).  In addition, their opportunity costs are large relative to the benefits that their land provides.   
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Characteristics Didn’t  receive 




and should have 
Received payments 







Total size in hectares 
 
Hectares of forest, 1993 
 
Average deforestation rate 
 
Predicted deforestation rate 
 
Predicted proportion of 
Progresa recipients 
 
Average environmental benefits 
per hectare 
 





















































































































      
7  Who gets the payments?   
In this section we examine the distribution of the most efficient payment program over different structural and 
social characteristics.  The first section considers overall ejido size and distance from the nearest town while the 
second looks at poverty and ethnic composition.  
      
7.1  Structural characteristics: size and distance 
Table 9 shows the distribution of the most efficient payments over size and distance classes.  It is interesting to 
note that in both cases, the lion’s share of the budget goes to the most remote and largest ejidos.  In the case of 
distance, these are the less efficient payments, while efficiency over size class is relatively homogenous.  
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7.1.1  Social characteristics 
This section considers payment distribution over poverty and ethnic composition of recipient groups.  
Encouragingly, we see higher participation both from the poor and from indigenous communities.  In addition, 
the percentage of the overall budget allocated to these ejidos is quite large and the efficiency of payments to 
them considerably higher than to the non-poor, non-indigenous communities.  We also see, however, that 
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8  Conclusion 
         In exploring the specification of a PES program for Mexican ejido forests, we have considered the 
larger context surrounding such payments and some of the details in implementing programs.  Before embarking 
on a national level payment for environmental services scheme, which may be costly to administer and difficult 
to target, it is important to consider other possibilities for mitigating deforestation.  Liberating win-win 
solutions, which involves getting rid of policies that contradict personal incentives, is the first step in this 
process.  The second is to take advantage of local markets for environmental services.  Once these two strategies 
have been exhausted, the common property forest area still at risk can be targeted for preservation through 
subsidy.  We have simulated four options for program design.   
        In analyzing these options, we have seen that forests, as well as deforestation, are distributed very 
unequally across the Mexican countryside, and that in some places forest cover has actually increased over the 
past seven years.  Other regions are in dire need of interventions to mitigate the loss of forests and to preserve 
the environmental services they provide.  Two out of the three program designs simulated use this information 
in order to target payments at communities with higher risk of converting forest land to other uses. 
        We used opportunity cost payments as a benchmark, making the assumption that ejidos will reject 
payments that do not exceed this minimum.  Comparing three payment programs, we find that the most 
PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE  26egalitarian approach is to pay the rental rate every year but to cap the number of allowable hectares, as currently 
piloted in Mexico.  This is also the least efficient of the three programs in terms of environmental benefits per 
dollar paid.  The highest efficiency comes from maximizing environmental benefits per dollar spent.  Payments 
that incorporate the risk of forest loss – whether the price paid is the opportunity cost or the environmental 
benefits – are also considerably more efficient than the capped payments.  The difference between these two 
programs is the recipient of the rent – the government in the first case and the ejido in the second.   
  In applying such a program, one must use predicted deforestation in order to avoid strategic behavior.  
We show that there is little advantage in venturing beyond easily observable variables in order to make this 
prediction.  There is some efficiency loss in using the prediction as opposed to the actual rate of forest loss, but 
a program using the predicted deforestation rate is still twice as efficient as a flat payment program. 
When we consider the distribution of the most efficient payment program according to characteristics 
of recipient communities, we find that larger and more remote ejidos receive the lion’s share of the budget, 
although they are not always the most efficient.  We also find that poor and indigenous communities have higher 
participation rates, get a larger proportion of the budget and provide higher benefits per dollar spent that non-
poor and non-indigenous ejidos.  Unfortunately, however, payments per member to the poor and indigenous are 
much lower than to their counterparts.   
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